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Abstract: This paper estimates the markup for the Mexican manufacturing
sector to detect the impact of trade liberalization on market power. Using
Hall’s proposal that states that a procyclical Solow residual is an indication
of market power, this research estimates the markup for different periods
to detect the change in market power after trade liberalization was
implemented. We account for the potential cyclical behavior of the markup
by including procyclical variables that affect the markup. The data shows
a markup that moves counter-cyclically. The evidence is consistent with
theoretical arguments advanced by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). We
pool four-digit industries and obtain estimates of the markup for the
whole manufacturing sector. For the entire manufacturing sector, we find
that trade liberalization acts as a market disciplining device that reduces
the degree of market power. At the sector level, we find a significant
reduction in market power in those sectors that experienced a strong
liberalization process after the GATT negotiations. Also, those sectors that
show a reduction in market power after the NAFTA implementation, show
a liberalization process in which protection is eliminated at a faster pace
than the average for the whole economy.
Keywords: market power, markups, manufacturing sector, trade
liberalization, Mexico.
Resumen: Este trabajo estima el markup en el sector manufacturero
mexicano para detectar el impacto de la liberalización comercial en el
poder de mercado. Usando la propuesta de Hall, la cual establece que un
residual procíclico de Solow indica la existencia de poder de mercado, el
trabajo estima el markup en diferentes períodos para detectar el cambio
en el poder de mercado después de que la liberalización comercial fue
implementada. Para tomar en consideración el potencial comportamiento
cíclico del markup, se incluyeron variables procíclicas que afectan dicho
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markup. Los datos muestran que éste se mueve de forma contracíclica.
La evidencia es consistente con los argumentos teóricos presentados por
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). Se agrupan las industrias a nivel de cuatro
dígitos y se obtienen estimaciones del markup para el sector
manufacturero en su conjunto. Se encuentra que la liberalización
comercial actúa como un mecanismo de disciplina en el mercado, que
reduce el grado de poder de mercado. A nivel sectorial, se encuentra una
reducción significativa en el poder de mercado en aquellos sectores que
experimentaron un fuerte proceso de liberalización después de las
negociaciones del GATT. También, aquellos sectores que muestran una
reducción en el poder de mercado después de la implementación del TLCAN,
presentan un proceso de liberalización en el cual la protección es eliminada
a un ritmo mayor que el promedio de la economía.




rade liberalization affects the behavior of an economy along several
dimensions. First, the opening of the trade regime generates a
reallocation of resources towards the activities in which the countries
are relatively more efficient. Second, the reduction in tariffs affects
the economic activity at the geographical level. Finally, the reduction
in protection, changes the competitive regime of the industries.
Increased competition from abroad should have an impact on price
setting behavior of domestic firms. This paper analyzes this latter
impact of trade liberalization. To fulfill this purpose, the paper
estimates the degree of market power with the help of Solow type
regression equations.
Several papers in the economic literature have measured the degree
of market power in the mexican manufacturing sector. There have
been two main approaches for the measurements of market power in
Mexico: on one hand, Casar et ál. (1990) used concentration indexes to
measure market power. On the other, an alternative literature
estimates market power with the aid of econometric techniques.
Castañeda (1998) estimates market power by using Hall’s identification
1 Thanks to David Mulato and Miguel Ángel de Jesús for data management and econometric
estimates.
Alejandro Castañeda211
assumption that states that the Solow residual is not intrinsically
procyclical. Thus, the finding of procyclical productivity is an
implication of market power. However, the empirical studies for Mexico
do not focus its analysis on the impact of trade liberalization.
This paper uses Hall’s assumption to estimate market power and
detects the impact of trade liberalization on mexican manufacturing
measurements of market power. To check for the possibility of false
inferences, due to the fact that the markup may have procyclical
behavior, the paper includes procyclical dummies in the regression.
Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) have found evidence of
procyclical behavior of the markup for the United States
manufacturing. This paper finds that the markup behaves
anticyclically in the mexican manufacturing sector.
This paper distinguishes itself from the previous literature in the
data set used for the estimation. We use data at the four-digit level.
This fact allows us to study the price setting behavior of firms that
produce similar products.2 In contrast, previous work (Castañeda, 1998)
used data with a level of aggregation (two-digits) that pools (in some
cases) rather dissimilar products.
In 1985, the Mexican government implemented a trade
liberalization program. In that year, the average tariff was 23.5 percent
and 92.2 percent of national production was protected by import license
requirements. By the end of 1987, the average tariff was reduced to
11.8 percent and the import license requirements covered only 25.4
percent of national production with a maximum rate of 20 percent. By
1994, the average import duty for the whole economy was 18.59. The
NAFTA agreement generated a second round of liberalization.
As expected, the paper finds that trade liberalization works as a
market-disciplining device that reduces the market power of the
industry. Grether (1996) found similar evidence. He used traditional
measurements of price-cost margins. He runs regressions by making
the price-cost margin a function of the Herfindahl concentration index,
the import penetration rate, and the industry level of capital-output
ratio. He uses panel data and estimates with fixed effects. As Domowitz,
Hubbard and Petersen (1986) have suggested: in contrast with
traditional industrial organization cross-section studies, “the
longitudinal nature of the data allows these kind of approaches to
2 The previous literature made its findings at the two-digit level.
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control for unobservable individual industry effects in the empirical
analysis” (p.14).
This paper distinguishes from traditional industrial organization
approaches (Grether, 1996) in the measurement of market power. In
the paper is not calculated the markup with the use of traditional
formulas that pretend to approximate the markup. Instead, it obtains
an estimate of this from Solow type regression equations. The
advantage of the econometric approach lies in that it has sound basic
principles. In contrast, the method that calculates the margin from
industry data assumes that variable cost is an appropriate surrogate
for marginal cost. Hoekman Looi and Olarreaga (2001) estimate
markups by using a similar technique to the one used in this paper.
However, they focus their analysis on a cross-country comparison on
how regulation, trade and country size affect the markup.
We investigate the changing patterns of the price-cost margins in
relation with trade liberalization by running panel regressions with
fixed effects over several periods. We have data from 1975 to 1998 and
we split the time series in two sample periods. First, the period before
Mexico joined the GATT (1975-1985) and then the period after Mexico
joined the GATT (1986-1998). We also study the changing pattern of
the markup for the period before NAFTA (1975-1993) and the period
after NAFTA (1994-1998).3
Although Mexico initiated a substantial liberalization program in
1985 with an average tariff that went down from 38.6 percent in 1985
to 14.9 percent in 1990 for the manufacturing sector, the average import
duty for the whole economy was still 18.59 in 1994. Thus, the NAFTA
negotiation implied a new round of liberalization. This study accounts
for these two rounds of liberalization.
Unfortunately, the information that we have for the time span after
NAFTA is relatively short and the period between NAFTA and GATT is
not very long. This fact has implications for the efficiency of the
estimation process, especially at the sector level where we have, in
some cases, a relatively few number of industries. Besides, it is
important to have a long period of estimation due to the evidence that
the markup shows evidence of cyclical fluctuations.4 Thus, to gain
efficiency, we split the estimation period only in two sample periods
3 Other studies that use this methodology for the mexican manufacturing sector use data
from national accounts, Castañeda (1998).
4 See Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
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(either before GATT and after GATT and before NAFTA and after NAFTA).
However, to gain more insight on the impact of these two rounds, we
present a table for the entire manufacturing sector with the sample
period divided in three. We also account for the cyclical behavior of
the markup by including procyclical variables in the regression. Hence,
we deal with the potential cyclical behavior of the markup in two ways,
by extending the period of estimation and by including procyclical
dummies in the regression.
I. Methodology
Let the technology be given by constant returns to scale production
function with no intermediate inputs:5
() () ()() () . t A t K , t L F = t Y (1)
A(t) represents technical progress, L(t) represents labor input, K(t)
is the stock of capital and Y (t) is value added. Differentiating with
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The dots over the variables denote derivatives with respect to time
and the subindexes express partial derivatives. Using Euler’s theorem
for homogenous functions and assuming homogeneity of degree 1 in






























æ = - (3)
5 The assumption of constant returns to scale is not very restrictive, if we have a situation
in which increasing returns are present, the procedure would detect the presence of market
power. The reason lies in that an industry with increasing returns to scale must have a price
above marginal cost to remain viable.
6 This is just a normalization, which is very common in the literature.
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Define c, p and w as marginal cost, price and wages, respectively.
The first order conditions of a profit-maximizing firm that has some
degree of market power can be expressed in the following way:
,       FL ) / ( b = p w
where b represents the markup (i.e. the ratio of price to marginal

























- b = - (4)
Solow assumed that b = 1 and used the last equation to calculate
the so-called Solow residual (A
·
/A). Hall, whom we follow, assumed
that technical progress (A) followed a random walk with drift and that
b is a constant that can be estimated. He uses instruments correlated
with business cycles to estimate b. In the first stage of the procedure,
the rate of growth of the labor-capital ratio weighted by the share of
wages in the value of output is projected in the space spanned by the
instruments. In the second stage, he finds the level of b that makes
the estimated error of the regression in (4) orthogonal to business cycle
fluctuations.
II. Data
The data was obtained from the Encuesta Industrial Anual from 1975
to 1998. The breakup point that divides the preGATT-postGATT period
is 1986-1987 and for NAFTA is 1993-1994.
The data give the level of investment at nominal prices and there
is no information for capital assets. Thus, we calculated the capital
assets by following the perpetual inventory model. We follow the
methodology suggested in Nadiri and Prucha (1996), to calculate the
initial stock of capital. In that paper, they define the initial stock of
capital as the level of investment divided by the rate of growth of the
stock of capital and the average rate of growth of depreciation for the
whole period. From that date on, we calculate the stock by using the
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investment series at constant prices and the depreciation series (also
at constant prices).
To calculate the level of investment at constant prices, we deflated
with an index obtained from the input-output matrix for various years.
For each year we looked at the input-output matrix for that year (or
the one for the closest year) and we trace, for each industry, the
purchases of durables. We calculated the percentage share for each
industry over the total purchases of durables made by the industry.
With this information we constructed a weighted average price index
by using the weights obtained from the input-output matrix, and the
price indexes obtained from the national accounts information. All this
procedure is done at the two-digit level (since the input-output matrix
is usually calculated at this level). For each four-digit level industry,
we look at the corresponding two-digit price index and we deflate the
investment series with that index. For depreciation, we use the same
index to obtain real depreciation.
To calculate the average, w, we took the ratio of labor income
(remuneraciones) to yearly hours. We calculated yearly hours from
employment data by assuming that each worker would work 40 hours
per week with two weeks of vacations per year. Output corresponds to
value added reported in the Encuesta. The industrial price deflator, p,
was obtained from INEGI at the four-digit level.
We illustrate in the following graph an estimate of the markup,
using equation (4) in a cross-section fashion.7
After viewing figure 1, we can see that after the GATT went into
effect, the markups start to decrease. This decrease is interrupted by
the increase in the 1995 period which corresponds to a period in which
the economy was in sharp recession. As we will see later in the paper,
the explanation for this behavior lies in the fact that the markup
behaves anticyclically. Thus, the recession of 1995 affected dramatically
the behavior of the markup. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986)
observe similar variations in the markups (or the equivalent price
cost margins)8 across time, and run regressions across sub-samples of
the whole period to observe the changing behavior of price cost margins
and the determinants.
7 Strictly speaking, Hall´s suggestions require the use of a certain span of time and the
projection of the right-hand side variable of equation (4) in the space spanned by the instruments.
Here we use pure cross-section techniques and no instruments, for the purposes of illustration.
8 We say equivalent price-cost margins because there is a one to one relation between these




Equation (4) is estimated for the mexican manufacturing sector to
detect the change in the level of market power generated by trade
liberalization. Thus, equation (4) is run over two sample periods that
pretend to detect the changes in market power due to changes in the
trade regime. The sample periods are: the period before GATT
(1975-1986) and the period after GATT (1987-1998), the period before
NAFTA (1975-1993) and the period after NAFTA (1994-1998).9 We pool
four-digit data into sectors and for the whole manufacturing sector, to
check for the change in the degree of market power. For the whole
manufacturing sector, we also include a table that divides the sample
Figure 1. The markup calculated with Hall’s methodology
9 As argued in the introduction, the reason for choosing this partition of the periods comes
from the reduced number of data that we have after the NAFTA agreement. The inter GATT-NAFTA
period is longer but not as long as the one before the GATT period. Thus to gain efficiency we chose
this partition. Also, we needed periods with large size to account for the potential cyclical behavior
in the markup. In Table 2 we divide the sample in three periods to analyze the two main changes
in the trade regime, the GATT process and the NAFTA agreement. We divide in three periods only


























period in three periods: The period before GATT, the period after
GATT-before NAFTA and the period after NAFTA.
To control for the potential cyclical behavior in the markup we
include a dummy variable that attains the value of one whenever GDP
is growing in that year and zero if the growth is negative. This variable
is included in equation (4) by multiplying the weighted change in the
labor-capital ratio by the dummy and including it as an additional
regressor.
The results are shown in the following order: first, we show the
change in the degree of market power for the whole manufacturing
sector pooled under the assumption of a common degree of market
power and fixed effects for each industry. For these type of estimates
we present two tables, in the first table (Table 1), we partition the
estimation period in two; in the second, we partition the estimation
period in three (Table 3). We include the procyclical dummy to control
for the cyclical behavior of the markup in tables 2 and 4. Then, we
pool industries into sectors and discuss the impact of trade
liberalization at the sector level (Table 6). For all sector estimates, we
assume fixed effects for each four-digit industry.
Hall (1988) argues that a procyclical productivity measurement
obtained from (4) (under the assumption of perfect competition, b =1 )
is an indication of the presence of market power (i.e. that the
assumption b = 1 is violated). He advocates the use of instrumental
variables correlated with business cycle fluctuations to obtain an
estimate of b. By using an instrument correlated with business cycles
he obtains the level of b that makes the estimated productivity
orthogonal to business cycle fluctuations.
In other words, when market power is present, the weighted change
in the labor-capital ratio variable may be correlated with technical
progress, thus yielding a classical simultaneous equation bias.
However, the use of instrumental variables may be inadequate if we
have a small sample and the instruments are poorly chosen. Nelson
and Starz (1988) have shown significant biases in instrumental variable
estimates when the sample is small and the performance of the
instrument is poor. Thus, the use of instrumental variables yields
asymptotically consistent estimates but may give biased estimates for
small samples and inadequate instruments. On the other hand,
non-instrumental estimates are asymptotically biased but behave
better for small samples. Given these arguments, we estimated
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equation (4) with instrumental and non-instrumental techniques. We
report in Table 1 the results for least squares and two-stage least
squares estimates. The instruments used are the current rate of gross
domestic product, its lagged value, the rate of change of the terms of
trade and the rate of change of the price of oil.



















































Thus, we pool all manufacturing industries in the sample indexed
by the variable i to obtain a common estimate for the markup for the
whole manufacturing sector. Assuming that technical progress for each
industry has a random walk with drift in levels, we have that the rate
of growth of technical progress for each industry (A
·
/A in the notation
of equation (4)) is given by a constant (the fixed effect) and the random
effect (w). To check for the impact of trade liberalization, we choose
two sample periods. First, we run a regression for the period before
trade liberalization took place (before GATT or before NAFTA), and then
we run a second regression for the period after trade liberalization
took place (after GATT or after NAFTA).10 In Table 3, discussed after, we
divide the sample in three periods, the before GATT period, the after
GATT-before NAFTA period and the after NAFTA period.
According to the results presented in Table 1, for both the OLS
estimates and the TSLS results, trade liberalization (through GATT and
NAFTA) reduces the degree of market power (the markup). In several
cases, the change in the level of market power appears to be rather
significant. Standard F-tests that determine the significance of the
change in the degree of market power between the two periods
considered, do show a breakup in the degree of market power for the
OLS estimates before and after NAFTA and also for the TSLS estimates,
before and after GATT and before and after NAFTA.
The average tariff rate for the manufacturing sector went from
38.6 in 1985 to 14.9 in 1990. Thus, substantial trade liberalization
10 Se Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988).
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Table 1. Whole manufacturing sector: markup estimation. Two periods
Coefficient (b) Std. Error T statistic b>1 R2
OLS
Before NAFTA 2.30’s 0.19 6.84 0.160
After NAFTA 1.83’s* 0.20 4.15 0.374
Before GATT 2.24’s 0.25 4.96 0.158
After GATT 1.99’s 0.15 6.60 0.289
Whole Period 2.07’s 0.14 7.64 0.174
TSLS
Before NAFTA 2.89’s 0.32 5.91 +
After NAFTA 1.80s* 0.21 3.81 +
Before GATT 2.89’s 0.36 5.25 +
After GATT 2.03’s* 0.21 4.90 +
Whole Period 2.58’s 0.26 6.08 +
Notes:
We imposed as restriction that all industrial sectors had the same degree of market power. We
also assume fixed effects for individual industries.
s Means that the estimated parameter is statistically significant at the 5 percent.
’ Denotes the rejection of the hypothesis of perfect competition at the 5 percent.
* Indicates that this coefficient is significantly smaller than the coefficient of the previous period
at the 5 percent.
+ There is not a unique R2 for the whole system. Rather, we have one for each industry included
in the pool.
was occurring in the mexican economy at the same time.11 However,
as mentioned in the introduction, the average import duty for the whole
economy in 1994 was 18.59, thus the trade liberalization process
initiated by NAFTA implied a second round liberalization process.
Kowalcsyk and Davis (1996) estimated that the NAFTA agreement
implied that Mexico took, on average, 5.64 years to phase out protection
from its NAFTA partners. The results shown in this table show that
after the trade liberalization program was announced in 1985 (joining
the GATT), the impact was a reduction in market power. Similarly, the
NAFTA announcement also had implications for a reduction in market
power.
In summary, the results of Table 1 suggest that trade liberalization
has an impact on market power. Grether (1996) uses calculated
measures of markups and concludes that exposure to foreign competition
significantly reduced the profit rate of mexican manufacturers. The
results of Table 1 are consistent with his conclusions.
11 See Hanson and Harrison (1995).
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Table 2. Whole manufacturing sector: cyclical behavior of the markup.
Two periods
b recession D b growth R2
OLS
Before NAFTA 3.64’s (0.38) –1.53s (0.33) 2.11’s (0.20) 0.174
After NAFTA 2.65’s* (0.43) –1.08s (0.51) 1.57’s* (0.24) 0.387
Before GATT 3.66’s (0.47) –1.86s (0.53) 1.80’s (0.28) 0.176
After GATT 2.75’s* (0.36) –0.90s (0.39) 1.85’s (0.16) 0.296
Whole Period 3.28’s (0.30) –1.51s (0.33) 1.77’s (0.15) 0.188
TSLS
Before N AFTA 4.17’s (0.59) –1.85s (0.88) 2.32’s (0.55) +
After NAFTA 2.65’s* (0.44) –1.07s (0.51) 1.57’s (0.15) +
Before GATT 3.97’s (0.61) –1.66s (0.76) 2.31’s (0.44) +
After GATT 2.91’s* (0.41) –1.20s (0.49) 1.71’s (0.24) +
Whole Period 3.70’s (0.42) –1.94s (0.58) 1.76’s (0.35) +
’ Means that the thesis of perfect competition is rejected, at least at the 10 percent level.
s Means that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent.
* Indicates that this coefficient is significantly smaller than the coefficient of the previous period
at the 5 percent.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
+ There is not a unique R2 for the whole system. Rather we have one for each industry included
in the pool.
To check for the robustness of the inferences drawn from Table 1
we consider explicitly the impact of business cycle fluctuations on our
measurements of the markup. In Table 2 we account for cyclical
behavior of the markup by including a multiplicative dummy (D) that
has the value of 1 whenever the GDP of the year is growing and the
zero value whenever there is a negative rate of growth. We multiply
this dummy by the weighted average rate of the labor-capital ratio in
equation (4) and run the regression with this extra regressor. Thus















































































where D represent the multiplicative dummy. The results shown are
for the whole (pooled) manufacturing sector. The first column in Table
2 shows the markup under the condition of negative growth. The third
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column in that table shows the markup in periods of growth. The second
column gives the value of the multiplicative dummy. The interesting
point to highlight from Table 2 is that the inclusion of the dummy
does not affect our inference with regard to the effect of trade
liberalization.
The OLS results show a significant reduction in the markup (in
periods of recession) for the two rounds of liberalization (NAFTA and
GATT). Similarly, the TSLS results show a significant reduction in the
NAFTA and GATT liberalization rounds. Standard F-tests confirm these
assertions. In periods of growth, the OLS results show that trade
liberalization affects significantly the degree of market power only for
the after NAFTA period. Thus, most of the results of Table 2 confirm
the conclusions advanced before: trade liberalization appears to affect
the price setting behavior of the mexican manufacturing firms.
Another interesting result obtained from Table 2 is the anticyclical
behavior of the markup. For almost all the results shown in the table,
the dummy appears significant at the 5 percent showing that the
markup changes across business cycle fluctuations. This evidence is
consistent with the theoretical arguments advanced by Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986) which argue that in periods of growth firms tend to
reduce the level of colussion to avoid the possibility of defectors.
To grasp better the differential impact of the two rounds of
liberalization, we divide the time span in three periods, the before
GATT period, the after GATT-before NAFTA period and the after NAFTA
period. Table 3 shows the results for the pooled manufacturing sectors
with the time span divided in these three periods. We estimate equation
(5). There is a tradeoff in the results shown in Table 1 and 3. On one
hand, those shown in Table 1 allow us to have a more efficient
estimation because we have a larger number of observations after
liberalization took place (for the after GATT estimates). On the other
hand, the partition in three periods shown in Table 3 gives us a better
description of the two rounds of liberalization. This happens at the
expense of the shortcomings accompanying a shorter period of
estimation.
The results of Table 3 are indicative of the impact of trade
liberalization, especially the effect of the NAFTA agreement on market
power. For the OLS technique of estimation, there is a significant
reduction in the degree of market power after the NAFTA agreement
went into effect. Standard F-tests for structural change confirm this
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intuition. The TSLS results show a reduction in the degree of market
power in the period after GATT-before NAFTA, although non-significant.
There is also a significant reduction in the markup for the transition
between after GATT-before NAFTA period to the after NAFTA period. The
OLS results point to an increase in the degree of market power after
the GATT trade liberalization went into effect.
The results of the after GATT-before NAFTA period for the OLS
technique appear counterintuitive.12 The effect may be due to the fact
that the markup might change across the cycle. We have a period of
recession or slow growth before the GATT went into effect (1982-1985)
and then we have an expansion period after the GATT went into effect
(especially from 1988).13 This might have affected the behavior of the
markup. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) show evidence that
the markup is procyclical in the U.S.
To check for this possibility, we estimate equation (6) in three
periods with the same dummy used for Table 2. Although there is still
an increase in the markup from the before GATT to the after GATT
before-NAFTA period, the increase does not appear significant. Table 4
illustrates the results. The first column shows the markup in periods
of negative growth, the second column shows the dummy and the third
column shows the markup in periods of growth.
12 We changed the year that defines the change between the before GATT period to the after
GATT-before NAFTA period, without finding significantly different results.
13 The reduction in market power after NAFTA may also be related to the impact of the 1995
recession.
Table 3. Whole manufacturing sector: markup estimation. Three
periods
Coefficient b Std. Error R2
OLS
Before GATT 2.24’s 0.25 0.158
After GATT-before NAFTA 2.76’s 0.28 0.338
After NAFTA 1.83’s* 0.20 0.374
TSLS
Before GATT 2.89’s 0.36 +
After GATT-before NAFTA 2.73’s 0.35 +
After NAFTA 1.80’s* 0.21 +
’ Means that the hypothesis of perfect competition is rejected, at least at the 10 percent level.
s Means that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent.
* Indicates that this coefficient is significantly smaller than the coefficient of the previous period
at the 5 percent.




To find out about the sector impact of NAFTA, we pooled four-digit
industries into sectors (in the appendix we give the definition of sectors).
For this section we estimate equation (5). The only difference with the
last section is that we only pool industries included in the sector. In
the last section we pool all manufacturing industries included in this
study. The section is organized as follows: first we implement
endogeneity tests for each sector, then we report the results of the
estimates at the sector level.
Given the arguments mentioned above about the potential
endogeneity of the weighted labor-capital ratio variable
[(wL / pY) (L
·
/ L – K
·
/ K) in the notation of equation (5)], we implemented
Hausman specification tests. The instruments used for the tests are
those mentioned above: the rate of growth of GDP and its lagged value,
the rate of change of the terms of trade and the rate of change of the
price of oil. The results are reported in Table 5.
We can see that for the period before GATT, six sectors (food and
beverages, glass and cement, wood, basic metals, machinery and
equipment and transport equipment) reject the hypothesis of no
endogeneity at the 10 percent and two at the 5 percent (machinery
and equipment and glass and cement). After GATT, the hypothesis of
no endogeneity is rejected for three sectors (chemicals, basic metals
and machinery and equipment). Before NAFTA, the hypothesis of no
Table 4. Whole manufacturing sector. Cyclical behavior and markup
estimation. Three periods
b recessions D b growth R2
OLS
Before GATT 3.66’s (0.47) –1.860s(0.53) 1.80’s (0.28) 0.176
After GATT-before NAFTA 3.94’s (0.81) –1.210s(0.84) 2.73’s (0.41) 0.231
After NAFTA 2.65’s (0.43) –1.080s(0.51) 1.57’s* (0.24) 0.387
TSLS
Before GATT 3.97’s (0.61) –1.660s(0.76) 2.31’s (0.44) +
After GATT-before NAFTA 3.76’s (0.86) –1.020 (0.95) 2.74’s (0.44) +
After NAFTA 2.61’s (0.47) 0.038 (0.87) 2.64’s (0.69) +
’ Means that the hypothesis of perfect competition is rejected, at least at the 10 percent level.
s Means that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent.
* Indicates that this coefficient is significantly smaller than the coefficient of the previous period
at the 5 percent.
+ There is not a unique R2 for the whole system. Rather, we have one for each industry included
in the pool.
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Table 5. Endogeneity tests for sectors
                              CHI SQUARE       PROB.                                 CHI SQUARE     PROB.
Before GATT After GATT
Food and bev 3.27 0.07 Food and bev 0.170 0.68
Textiles 0.69 0.41 Textiles 0.110 0.74
Paper 0.87 0.35 Paper 0.240 0.63
Wood 2.71 0.10 Wood 0.003 0.97
Chemicals 0.04 0.84 Chemicals 6.220 0.01
Glass and ce 3.73 0.05 Glass and ce 1.210 0.27
Basic metals 5.40 0.02 Basic metals 2.780 0.10
Metal prod 0.16 0.68 Metal prod 0.640 0.42
Mach and eq 8.44 0.00 Mach and eq 6.130 0.01
Trans equip 11.05 0.00 Trans equip 0.310 0.58
Before NAFTA After NAFTA
Food and bev 4.19 0.04 Food and bev 0.020 0.88
Textiles 0.05 0.83 Textiles 2.900 0.08
Wood 0.03 0.87 Wood 1.100 0.29
Paper 0.04 0.85 Paper 0.370 0.54
Chemicals 0.30 0.59 Chemicals 3.080 0.08
Glass and ce 0.03 0.85 Glass and ce 0.270 0.60
Basic metals 1.17 0.28 Basic metals 0.480 0.49
Metal prod 4.10 0.04 Metal prod 2.060 0.15
Mach and eq 1.10 0.29 Mach and eq 11.370 0.00
Trans equip 5.19 0.02 Trans equip 3.260 0.07
endogeneity is rejected in three sectors at the 5 percent level (food and
beverages, metal products and transport equipment). After NAFTA, the
hypothesis of no endogeneity is rejected in four sectors at the 10 percent
level (textiles, chemicals, machinery and equipment and transport
equipment). One sector rejects the hypothesis at the 5 percent level
(transport equipment).
Since most cases do not reject the hypothesis of no endogeneity,
the results reported in Table 5 could be used to justify the use of
non-instrumental variable techniques. However, the number of sectors
in which instrumental variables is recommendable, can be significant
for some periods such as the period before GATT. Also, the arguments
mentioned above, about the advantages and disadvantages of the use
of instrumental variables, advise us to report both sets of estimates.14
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Thus, Table 6 reports both, the non-instrumental and the instrumental
variables results.
In Table 6 we show the impact of trade liberalization at the sector
level. We pool four-digit industries into sectors and show the impact of
trade liberalization.
We tested for the restriction that imposes a common markup across
industries included in the sectors. Before GATT, we rejected the
hypothesis of homogeneity in paper, chemicals and metal products.
After GATT, the test reported a rejection on homogeneity for food and
beverages, paper, glass and cement and basic metals. With regard to
the period before NAFTA, the test rejected the hypothesis of homogeneity
for glass and cement and metal products. After NAFTA, the results reject
the homogeneity hypothesis for food and beverages, paper, and basic
metals. In the worst case (the after GATT period), the hypothesis of
homogeneity was rejected in only half of the sectors, for the other four
periods (before GATT, before NAFTA and after NAFTA) the test is rejected
in less than half the sectors.
The sector results appear less definitive than the whole
manufacturing pooled estimates. Some estimates do increase after GATT
and (or) NAFTA implementation. Most of them do not have a significant
increase.15
The SUR estimates of food and beverages show this property. Even
though there is an increase in the markup, the difference in the size of
the markup is not enough when we look at the size of the standard
deviation of the estimates. An F-test confirms the non-significance of
the change. In some cases, the difference in the size of the markups
turned out to be smaller than the standard deviations. The SUR results
on wood and textiles show this behavior. As before, an F-test confirms
our conclusion.
As expected, the GATT liberalization generated a reduction in the
size of the markups for several SUR estimates: machinery and
equipment, metal products, chemicals, paper and transport equipment.
As before, several cases do not show a significant decrease in the
markup. However, an F-test confirms that machinery and equipment,
chemicals, metal products and transport equipment do show a
15 However, the SUR estimates of Glass and Cement for the GATT change, do show a significant
increase in the markup. We have a similar result for the 3SLS estimate for the GATT change in
machinery and equipment. A potential explanation for the Glass and Cement sector is the highly
collusive behavior that the cement industry has been showing in the last years. The Comisión
Federal de Competencia is now conducting an investigation for monopoly power in this industry.
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Table 6. Sector results. Markup estimates. Two different periods
SUR Before GATT R2 After GATT R2
Food and Beverages 1.87s pc (0.70) 0.62 2.80s mp (0.38) 0.36
Wood 1.54 (2.40) 0.05 2.05s mp (0.18) 0.91
Machinery and Equip. 2.24s mp (0.30) 0.20 1.39s * pc (0.30) 0.15
Basic Metals 2.69s mp (0.50) 0.21 2.04s mp (0.44) 0.28
Glass and Cement 1.68s mp (0.32) 0.22 2.67s mp (0.16) 0.67
Chemicals 2.59s mp (0.27) 0.35 1.80s * mp (0.15) 0.51
Paper 3.03s mp (0.51) 0.31 2.55s mp (0.77) 0.16
Textiles 0.46pc (0.35) 0.10 1.29pc (0.44) 0.17
Metal Products 2.18s mp (0.32) 0.25 1.39s * pc (0.30) 0.35
Transport Equipment 2.85s mp (0.29) 0.72 2.06s * mp (0.33) 0.40
SUR Before NAFTA R2 After NAFTA R2
Food and Beverages 2.06s mp (0.53) 0.25 2.71s mp (0.59) 0.64
Wood 1.52 (1.93) 0.03 2.06s mp (0.22) 0.94
Machinery and Equip. 2.03s mp (0.25) 0.18 1.02pc (0.92) 0.10
Basic Metals 2.81s mp (0.46) 0.21 1.96s * mp (0.02) 0.27
Glass and Cement 2.17s mp (0.31) 0.37 2.87s mp (0.50) 0.12
Chemicals 2.61s mp (0.37) 0.34 1.53s * mp (0.35) 0.10
Paper 2.32s mp (0.43) 0.30 1.91pc (2.33) 0.31
Textiles 0.49pc (0.41) 0.15 0.99pc (0.03) 0.28
Metal Products 2.32s mp (0.40) 0.26 1.26s * mp (0.12) 0.59
Transport Equipment 2.74mp (0.28) 0.64 1.81s * mp (0.19) 0.22
3SLS Before GATT R2 After GATT R2
Food and Beverages 3.34s mp (1.01)2s + 2.68s mp (0.54)2s +
Wood –7.39 (9.40) + 2.06s mp (0.28) +
Machinery and Equip. 1.31s pc (0.45) + 2.26s mp (0.41) +
Basic Metals 0.97pc (0.93) + 0.98pc (0.63) +
Glass and Cement 2.39s mp (0.68) + 3.08s mp (0.41) +
Chemicals 2.52s mp (0.52) + 2.17s mp (0.20) +
Paper 3.72s mp (0.86) + 3.12s pc (1.28) +
Textiles 0.63pc (0.46) + 0.93pc (0.68) +
Metal Products 2.57s pc (1.07) + 1.80s mp (0.38) +
Transport Equipment 3.77s mp (0.42) + 1.96s * mp (0.38) +
3SLS Before NAFTA R2 After NAFTA R2
Food and Beverages 4.00s mp (1.05)2s + 3.13s mp (1.01)2s +
Wood 0.41pc (7.21) + 3.15pc (2.00) +
Machinery and Equip. 2.04s pc (0.78)2s + 3.64s mp (1.52)2s +
Basic Metals 1.69pc (1.19) + 2.57s mp (0.19) +
Glass and Cement 2.85s mp (0.67)2s + 2.42pc (1.57)2s +
Chemicals 2.49s mp (0.68)2s + 2.93s mp (1.00)2s +
Paper 2.87s mp (0.95) + 0.01pc (3.40) +
Textiles 0.80pc (0.98) + 2.81s mp (0.14) +
Metal Products 3.34s pc (1.65)2s + 2.01s mp (0.52)2s +
Transport Equipment 3.33s mp (0.50) + 1.81s * mp (0.19) +
We imposed as restriction that all industries inside a sector has the same degree of market power.
We also assume fixed effects for individual industries.
s Means that the estimated parameter is significant at the 10 percent level.
mp Denotes the rejection of the hypothesis of perfect competition.
pc Means that we cannot reject the hypothesis of perfect competition
2s Means that we were not able to obtain the 3SLS estimate and thus the 2SLS result is reported.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
* Indicates that this coefficient is significantly smaller than the coefficient of the previous period
at the 5 percent.
+ There is not a unique R2 for the whole system. Rather, we have one for each industry included in the pool.
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statistically significant reduction in the size of the markups for the
GATT liberalization process.
Hanson and Harrison (1995) show (see Table 2 of the
aforementioned paper) that all these sectors experienced a strong
liberalization process between 1985 and 1990. According to Table 2 of
the Hanson and Harrison paper, chemicals went from a production
weighted average tariff rate of 29.9 in 1985 to 14.4 in 1990. Metal
products (which according to their classification include some
industries from machinery and equipment, from transport equipment
as well as the metal products industries from this paper classification)
went from 46.3 in 1985 to 16.1 percent in 1990.
When we include a multiplicative dummy (in the SUR estimates)
to control for the potential cyclical behavior of the markup we still
have an impact of the GATT liberalization round on machinery and
equipment and metal products. The markup (in times of positive
growth) shows a significant reduction for these sectors.
Similarly, for the NAFTA round of liberalization, the SUR estimates
indicate that chemicals, basic metals, metal products and transport
equipment have a significant reduction in the level of the markup.
Kowalcksy and Davis (1996) show that these sectors have a
liberalization process in which protection is eliminated at a faster pace
than the average for the whole economy. Basic metals have a phase
out process of 3.38 years; chemicals and related products have a phase
out process of 4.83 years; machinery and transport equipment has a
phase out progression of 3.28 years, the average for all imports is 5.64
years.
The inclusion of a dummy that controls for the potential cyclical
behavior of the markup does not affect our inference regarding the
SUR results of the impact of NAFTA on basic metals, metal products
and transport equipment. These sectors still show a significant
reduction in the markup (for periods of positive growth) after the NAFTA
implementation.
The 3SLS estimates show evidence of a significant reduction in
the markup for transport equipment (for both GATT and NAFTA). Some
other sectors show a non-significant reduction of the markup –food
and beverages, chemicals paper and metal products after the GATT
implementation. There are also non-significant increases in the size
of the markup.16 Consistent with Nelson and Starz (1988) results, the
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3SLS estimates are more imprecise, the ratio of the estimate to the
standard deviation is smaller (on average) than the corresponding ratio
for the SUR results.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we estimate the markup econometrically. This
estimate is used to determine the impact of trade liberalization. In
contrast with the previous literature that estimated the impact of trade
liberalization by calculating the markup from industry data and
assuming that variable costs are the right surrogate for marginal costs,
this study uses Hall’s suggestions to estimate the markup. This
approach has stronger microeconomic foundations. Nonetheless, the
results are similar to those obtained using calculated markups (Grether
1996). Most of our pool estimates for the whole manufacturing sector
show that trade liberalization reduces market power for the whole
manufacturing sector. This result has implications for economic
welfare. As market power diminishes, deadweight losses diminish too.
The reduction in markups implied by trade liberalization generates
additional welfare gains to those traditionally stressed in the trade
literature.
At the sector level, we find a reduction of the impact of trade
liberalization only in some industries (machinery and equipment,
chemicals, metal products and transport equipment according to the
SUR results). The evidence on tariffs suggests that these industries
experienced strong reduction in their production-weighted average
tariff rates after GATT. Also, the after NAFTA results indicate that all
industries that experienced a significant reduction in the size of the
markup had a phase out process in which protection is eliminated at a
faster pace than the average for the manufacturing sectors. The
coincidences in these evidences enhance the confidence of our results.
The paper controls for potential cyclical behavior of the markup
and finds evidence in favor of anticyclical behavior of the markup.
These results are consistent with the theoretical arguments pointed
out by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and differ with the evidence
found for other countries.17
17 See Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
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In a related study we are investigating the impact of NAFTA on
markups calculated from industry data (similarly to Grether, 1996).
Hopefully, this will shed more light on the impact of trade liberalization
on these markets. In the agenda for future research remains the
analysis of the cyclical properties of the markup in relation with the
type of industries that exhibit this behavior, with the type of industry
defined according to certain categories: concentration, type of good
produced (durables, non-durables), etc.
Appendix
– The food and beverages sector includes six-digit industries 311101,
311203, 311301, 311404, 311501, 311405, 311701, 312200, 311304,
311903, 312123, 313040, 313040 and 313050.
– The machinery and equipment sector includes six-digit industries
381300, 381408, 381407, 381401, 382101, 383301, 383204, 383108,
383107.
– The basic metals sector includes six-digit industries 371001, 371006,
372003, 372005.
– The glass and cement sector includes six-digit industries 362011,
362013, 362021, 362022, 369111.
– The chemical sector includes six-digit industries 351300, 352100,
352222, 352210, 355001.
– The paper sector includes six-digit industries 341010, 341022,
341031.
– The textiles sector includes six-digit industries 321202, 321205,
321207.
– The metal products sector includes six-digit industries 381300,
381408, 381407.
– The transport equipment sector includes six-digit industries 384110,
384121, 384122.
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